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Introduction
Intellectual Property in the Age of the
Internet
SUSANNA FREDERICK FISCHER+
This collection of essays explores the central problem of copyright law from a
rule of law perspective. The major challenge for copyright law is to strike the
appropriate balance between providing sufficient economic incentives to
encourage authors to create, while also ensuring adequate access to creative
works. The relevance of the rule of law seems evident in an era in which digital
technology makes copying easy, quick, and increasingly widespread. How is the
law to be formulated so that it retains the social respect necessary to ensure that,
in the words of Aristotle, "the law should govern?"' While the authors in this
collection ascribe to a variety of philosophical views and represent diverse
schools of thought, they come together in seeing that the resolution of this
problem within the limits of the rule of law finds its anchor in an attitude of
respect for the common good.
Although the essays included here were all written several years ago in
response to the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Eldred v. Ashcroft,2 their
insights remain just as timely now. The questions raised above still pose
challenges for Congress as it assesses possible changes to intellectual property
law, such as the Innovation Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act3, which
would protect fashion designs currently outside of the scope of copyright law.
Courts also continue to confront these questions in cases requiring judicial
interpretation of the federal copyright statute and the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution. 4
The difficulty of these questions is shown by the divided outcome in the most
recent copyright case argued before the United States Supreme Court, Costco
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.5 The key issue in the case, the breadth of the first
Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1 ARISTOTLE, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, Book III: Chapter XVI, 1287(a) (William Ellis, trans., 1912).
2 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 769 (2003).
3 Innovation Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010).
4 17 U.S.C. § 101 etseq., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
s Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd per curium, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
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sale doctrine permitting the owner of a lawful copy to sell or otherwise dispose
of that copy without the copyright owner's permission, directly implicates the
proper balance between the rights of owners and users of copyrighted works.6
Asked to determine whether the proper interpretation of the copyright statute
was that the first sale doctrine does not apply to imported goods manufactured
abroad, the Court could not reach agreement. The result was an unsigned per
curiam opinion affirming, by an equally divided Court, the decision of the Ninth
Circuit below. The Court's inability to agree generates uncertainty as to the
scope of copyright rights and thereby raises rule of law concerns.
All of the authors in this collection agree that resolving the conflict between
copyright owners who seek greater protection from the law and users who
desire unrestricted access to copyrighted material requires attention to the
common good. Their essays take a wide variety of approaches to the nature and
effect of that concept.
Lawrence Lessig offers a concept of the social good that is at stake in the
conflict over the scope and power of copyright rights. This is the continued
existence of what he calls the innovation commons, which Lessig describes as "a
place where everyone is equally allowed to innovate." An innovation commons
generates explosive creativity, such as that which has resulted from the
internet's original architectural design.7 Lessig argues that an alternative
concept presents itself that should be rejected: that of the "anti-commons." In an
anti-commons, too many people can control others' use of a resource, resulting
in a failure of development of that resource. 8
Several other authors explore the application to copyright law of concepts of
the common good found in particular philosophical traditions. Susanna Fischer
offers the notion of the common good found in Catholic social thought, with its
acknowledgment of the universal destination of all goods.9 Amitai Etzioni
proposes the correlation of rights and responsibilities inherent in
communitarian concepts of human flourishing.10 Jude Dougherty suggests
concepts of virtue and moral obligation found in ancient philosophy and
revolving around respect for the nature of moral agency.1
6 Id at 983.
7 Lawrence Lessig, The Tragedy of the Innovation Commons: Reconciling Private Claims with Public Interest, post,
pp. 35-48.
8 Id at 36.
9 Susanna Frederick Fischer, Catholic Social Teaching, the Rule of Law, and Copyright Protection, post, pp. 63-72
[hereinafter Fischer].
10 Amitai Etzioni, The Challenge of the Internet "Commons" in Communitarian Perspective, post, pp. 59-62
[hereinafter Etzioni].
11 Jude Dougherty, Ancients and Moderns on the Subject of Property, post, pp. 73-81 [hereinafter Dougherty].
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Rather than focusing on a particular philosophical tradition, Margaret Jane
Radin explores the values that should be taken into consideration in
conceptualizing the common good. Radin argues that these values should not be
limited to economic ones, but also must include noncommodified values, such as
free expression. She argues that the law has lately been moving in the opposite
direction by increasingly commodifying information.12 Radin provides two
examples of the resulting social harm: invasions of personal privacy when
personal data is legally propertized, and damage to the social value of free
expression when the copyright law of fair use is interpreted as having the sole
goal of economic efficiency.13 She also decries the use of absolutist property
rhetoric to expand the commodification of information. 14
Other contributors explore the extent to which the utilitarian incentive
rationale found in the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution adequately or fully protects fundamental social values.
Seana Shiffrin focuses on the social value of the First Amendment in
questioning whether the incentive theory is a sound justification for current
copyright law. Shiffrin raises several problems with the incentive theory,
including a dearth of research as to whether copyright incentives are really
necessary for creative production and if so, what level and type.ls She also
highlights a related philosophical problem: how can it be known that the amount
and social value of incented works is greater than those that would be created in
the absence of copyright protection? 16
In contrast, Edward Damich takes the position that the incentive rationale is
"non-negotiable," since it is embodied in the constitutional text. He contends
that both sides in Eldred accepted this.17 But Damich argues that focusing solely
on the utilitarian rationale is incomplete. Judges and policymakers, within the
proper limits of their respective roles, should not lose sight of the fact that the
incentive rationale is undergirded by the natural law tradition, which is
especially solicitous of fundamental privacy values as well as the right of
personality.18 Additionally, Damich urges judges to more consciously draw on
the philosophical basis of copyright law. They should do so by adequately
respecting the natural law rights of personality and privacy, and also by giving
appropriate deference to the policymaking role of Congress in determining
12 Margaret Jane Radin, The Rule of Law in the Information Age: Reconciling Private Rights and Public Values, post,
pp. 83-105 [hereinafter Radin].
13 Id. at 84-86.
14 Id. at 89.
is Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Incentives Argumentfor Intellectual Property Protection, post, pp. 49-58.
16 Id. at 52.
17 Edward J. Damich, The Philosophical Postulates of Current Copyright Law: A View of the Legislative History, post,
pp. 107-123, [hereinafter Damich]. See also Eldred, supra note 2 at 803.
18 Id. at 107-108, 110-112.
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whether a particular copyright law satisfies the utilitarian calculus mandated by
the United States Constitution. 19
Many of the essays focus on the challenges posed to the rule of law as a result
of the widespread deployment of digital technologies.
Susanna Fischer points out that even as Congress has strengthened and
expanded copyright rights as a response to the widespread and near perfect
copying made easy and cheap by these technologies, copyright law is widely
flouted or ignored. 20 She encourages judges and legislators to bear in mind
concepts offered by Catholic social thought, including human dignity and the
universal destination of goods, which can help them to respond to the pattern of
defiance to the law in a way that will generate greater respect for law. 21 She
cites Eldred as an example of a case where the majority ignored these values, but
the dissent endorsed them.22
Amitai Etzioni is also concerned about disrespect for the rule of law, which he
characterizes as the result of a lack of social responsibility by users of
copyrighted works. His communitarian vision requires rights to be balanced
with responsibilities, so that the common good will flourish.23 Etzioni points out
that unless the laws can be effectively enforced, "they will become obsolete," and
ultimately creativity and innovation will be stymied 24 Etzioni advocates
changes to copyright law to protect the rule of law. In particular, he
recommends shortening the copyright term while also strengthening its
protections for creators. 25
Jude Dougherty is concerned about threats to the rule of law, which he sees as
the natural rights foundation of property and intellectual property rights.26
Dougherty critiques post-Enlightenment thinkers, such as Marx, Mill, and Rawls,
for giving too much importance the value of equality in the context of private
property and ignoring the enduring insights of ancient philosophers like
Aristotle and Cicero.27 Their writings reveal an appreciation for the institution
of private property which is not only the result of customary usage and
legislation, but also premised on a natural moral order which duly rewards
talent and virtue but requires property owners to serve as stewards for the
common good.28 Dougherty contends that where copyright law becomes
19 Id. at 108,112, 120-121, 123.
20 Fischer, supra note 9, at 63.
21 Id. at 71-72.
22 Id. at 68-71. See also Eldred, supra note 2.
23 Etzioni, supra note 10, at 60.
24 Id. at 62.
2s Id.
26 Dougherty, supra note 11, at 73.
27 Id at 73-75.
28 Id.
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untethered from its natural law foundations, the result for society will be
predictably litigious and negative. 29
Margaret Jane Radin is troubled by the consequences of information
commodification for the rule of law. She believes that as copyright law
increasingly propertizes and commodifies culture and communication, it
increasingly violates the rule of law as traditionally formulated.30 In particular,
the expanded copyright term at issue in Eldred violates the rule of law
requirement that the law should not be retroactive, but should exist in advance
of the conduct it regulates.31 Additionally, the rule of law requires that laws be
interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning. Radin illustrates how, in the
Eldred case, the government and Supreme Court failed to adequately recognize
the threat to the rule of law posed by retroactive laws like the Copyright Term
Extension Act.32 Radin also thinks that the government and Court ignored the
plain meaning of the term "limited" in the Constitution by giving undue
deference to congressional power to legislate under the Intellectual Property
Clause.33
In contrast to Radin, Edward Damich argues that appropriate deference to
legislative decisions is key to ensuring that the copyright system retains the
stability and predictability required by the rule of law. As long as legislative
policy adheres to the rule of law, judges should respect the rule of law by
exercising judicial restraint. They should respect the climate of practical
compromise in which legislation is drafted and refrain from substituting their
own philosophical ideas for the legislative judgments.34
Oren Bracha's essay contributes a historical perspective to the debate over
intellectual property rights. He points out that commentary on intellectual
property law employs two incompatible models. The first approach views such
law as the product of practical reason, while the second considers it to be the
result of realpolitik.35 Bracha contends that the two models are largely separate,
and this separation has led to negative results and faulty discourse.36 His essay
explores the historical role of three variables in developing the separate models:
property, authorship, and technology. 37 Bracha also views Eldred through a
29 Id at 80-81.
30 Radin, supra note 12, at 83-86, 96.
31 Id. at 101-102 See also Eldred, supra note 2, at 792.
32 Radin, supra note 12, at 101-102.
33 Id. at 102-103.
34 Damich, supra note 17, at 108, 121.
35 Oren Bracha, Who Killed Politics? Past and Present Perspectives on the Political Sphere of Intellectual Property,
post, pp. 123-154 [hereinafter Bracha].
36 Id. at 126-128.
37 Id. at 136-146.
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historical lens. He depicts Eldred38 as a catalyst for social change as significant as
Brown v. Board of Education was for the civil rights movement.39
While the essays focus particular attention on the constitutionality of the
copyright term extensions at issue in Eldred,40 they all raise far broader concerns
about the appropriate copyright balance and the maintenance of the rule of law
that are just as relevant today as when Eldred was decided. Congress and the
courts will likely continue to grapple with these challenges for years to come.
This collection of essays contains a wealth of thought-provoking ideas as to how
legislators and jurists should address the ongoing struggle to achieve the most
socially beneficial balance between the owners and users of copyrights, while at
the same time respecting and protecting the rule of law. It is hoped that it will
not only be of use to those who are actively involved in making, interpreting, and
commenting on copyright law and policy, but also of great interest to general
readers. May the essays collected here be inspiring and stimulating to all who
read them.
38 Eldred, supra note 2.
1 Bracha, supra note 35, at 152-154. See also 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40 Eldred, supra note 2, at 771.
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